In the period since the 2008 Wall Street crash, little consensus has emerged on its causes or actions to prevent a recurrence. Our capability for rational decision making was overwhelmed. Viewing the entire financial system as a huge, richly interconnected organization suggests that its structure and associated management practices are suited for a far simpler environment. An organization that is large relative to its environment and sufficiently complex to require the coordination of specialized expertise cannot function by enabling decision makers (...) to respond only to local demands. The resulting inability to recognize critical interdependencies and the nature of their risk makes periodic catastrophic failure likely. Specifically, compartmentalization of information, influence, and reward creates a myopic decision environment in which individual decision makers are unlikely to make effective or ethical decisions. Useful criteria for evaluating solutions can be suggested by considering the interaction of two factors: limited human information processing capability and the effect of motivation on information processing. Taken together, they suggest that human information processing is both limited and opportunistic. We cannot process all information available and the information selected for processing narrows to that needed to achieve salient rewards. Because of this, the organization's reward practices and their effect on motivation are a critical variable. Large financial rewards contingent upon short term, local, simplistic measures inevitably narrow the focus of decision maker's attention to a small part of the system. In contrast, dominant intrinsic motivation is rooted in awareness of, and responsibility for, broader outcomes. Each type of motivation differs in its requirements for sharing of information, influence, and reward. These, in turn, determine the adaptability of the organization to complexity and change. While this has significant ethical implications, its logic rests on the limitations of human information processing and motivation. Aligning human motivation and information flow to the demands of a complex, turbulent financial environment is the challenge we must meet to prevent further cataclysms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 287 the writers is deeply and seriously involved in answering what he takes to be fundamental questions about "what there is." But at the same time, it must be said that the degree of absorption which the essays reveal has about it an air of quaintness, as if, in reading them, one had suddenly discovered a community of people who spoke nothing but Elizabethan English. For the (...) problems constructed and dealt with in this way emerge from some earlier philosophical clime: from the worlds of Meinong's Investigations Into the Theory of Objects and Russell's Lectures on Logical Atomism, where the talk is of "elementary propositions," "The Ideal Language," "bare particulars," "denoting," what "subsists" as distinct from what "exists," and so on. If any of the writers are aware of the contributions made to philosophy by the later Wittgenstein (mentioned briefly only once in the text, p. 89), Wisdom (not referred to at all), Austin (who appears in a footnote as a translator of Frege), Ryle (mentioned once), and Strawson, this awareness is suppressed with a ruthlessness that borders on perversity. There is clearly here no feeling for the changes that have occurred in philosophy since 1933, or any awareness of the fact that the problems, which they pose, stem to a large extent from just those presuppositions which led to the abandonment of Logical Atomism some thirty years ago./n saying these things, I am, of course, not to be understood as implying that ontological investigations per se are always to be discounted, or that "progress in philosophy is linear," but merely that the fecundity of this particular mode of investigation has long since been shown to be exhausted. Finally, it is surprising to the reviewer that the volume does not contain a paper by Professor Gustav Bergmann. Most of the authors are former students of Professor Bergmann --and their work coincides with the scope of his own interests, as well as reflecting a similar approach to the problems being dealt with. To some extent, however, this omission is more apparent than real since he is mentioned frequently in the text--and, unless I have miscounted, some thirty-seven times in the footnotes. AVRUM STROLL University of California, San Diego BOOK NOTES Centre International de Synth~se, XXIV" Semaine de Synth~se" L'expdrience. 28 Mai-l" Juin, 1962. Paris, Editions A. Michel [1964]. 476 pp., 8 fig. = Revue de synth~se, 3m" serie, No. 29-31, Jan.-Sept., 1963. This large volume of the Revue de Synth~se deserves special notice, even though it is impossible to give it a critical review here. Here are gathered critical, empirical reports from competent scientists and other savants, including the whole range and all the domains of knowledge, on the concrete aspects of experience which special fields and methods of knowing reveal. Viewing experience from this wide perspective, and including in it what the Germans have called Erlebnis in order to do justice to the empirical aspects of existentialism as well as of phenomenology, these scholars have performed a basic service for the sciences and for philosophy. In addition to the more traditional distinctions between cognitive, moral, aesthetic, and religious experience, there are illuminating accounts of geological and biological empiricism (relating the terrestrial sciences to nuclear and cosmic sciences), and of experience englobante as distinguished from experience objective. Such catholic empiricism, such synthetic discriminations are indeed a great contribution to contemporary discussion and to progress in philosophical vocabulary and sympathies. 288 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Among the participants in this work are: G. Bouligant, George Bastide, Jean Boisset, Olivier Lacombe, Jean Lameere, Joseph Moreau, and Jean Wahl. Many other authors have contributed briefer communications. --H.W.S. Chalus, Paul, L'homme et la religion. Recherches sur les sources psychologiques des croyances. Pal~olithique-N~olithique-Age du Bronze-Cr&e-IsraEl-Iran. Paris, Editions A. Michel, 1963. 510 pp., 22 figs., 12 pl., diagrs. = L'l~volution de l'Humanit& Biblioth~que de Synth&e Historique. S~rie compl~mentaire. 33.93 NF. This addition to the notable series of works sponsored by the Centre International de SynthOse in Paris attempts to combine the history and psychology of religion. The theme is indicated in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 303 philosophical, artistic) forms as a vivid protest "from within." If, on the contemporary scene, religion wants to actualize itself and the Church "to answer the question implied in man's very existence" (p. 49), then theology has to use the material of an "existential analysis" of the various cultural realms, confronting this material "with the answer implied in the Christian message" (p. 49). Part II gives so (...) to say instances of such a theological appreciation of cultural expressions. Successively passed in review are: religious "language" (signs and symbols), artistic "style," existential philosophy, psychoanalysis, science, morality, and education. Though each essay is illuminating, those on Existential Philosophy: its historical meaning (1944) and The Theological Significance o/Existentialism and Psychoanalysis (1955) may be called brilliant. Part III contains comparisons of theological thought in Germany and America (in which the author gives some personal reminiscences), and of religion in America and Russia, together with An Evaluation o/Martin Buber (1948). The book concludes with Part IV: Communicating the Christian Message: a Question to Christian Ministers and Teachers (1952), which appears to be relevant to Christians in general. It may be said that it has been a privilege for America to have received among the intellectual refugees of the "catastrophe" of 1933 this powerful German thinker, just as it must have bcen a privilege for Dr. Tillich to be able to elaborate his thought in a country where it received such great response in thoughtful circles. One recognizes behind this thinking the essential continental problems of the relation between philosophy of religion and theology, between religion and culture, between personal existence and industrial society: questions becoming American problems as well. In all his work, the role of religion is positively appreciated, and an appeal is made to a religious "courage to be," reminding man in his estranged life situation of his essential nature and his final destiny. It is not with the deus est esse, neither the certitudo ex se ipsis, nor the ultimate concern, nor the unconditional, that we should like to voice here some questions with regard to the author's views. Rather it is with two seemingly minor questions. Accepting his circumscription of religion as "the dimension of depth," we would be interested to see if within or beside a Theology o] culture, a Theology o] religion would also be possible, having as its subject religious expressions under and outside the authority of the Gospel. A second question arises from the author's statement: "Self is good, self-affirmation is good, self-acceptance is good, but selfishness is bad because it prevents both self-affirmation and self-acceptance" (p. 145). Although this phrase may have its particular context in Moralisms and Morality (1955), I personally wonder if the deflated Self does not risk becoming the essential prison of industrial society, in which, unfortunately, there is no Nirwana.... JACQUES WAA_RDENB URG University o[ California, Los Angeles BOOK NOTES John A. Mourant, ed., Introduction to the Philosophy oI Saint Augustine. Selected Readings and Commentaries. University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press [1964]. Pp. ix + 366. $7.50. This is an excellent introduction to the philosophy of Augustine as well as to the general Romanizing of the Platonic tradition. Professor Mourant's thirty pages of Introduction (supplemented appropriately by the great "Prayer" in which the Saint explains the world to his Creator), the bibliographical references, and the critical comments, all provide a concise exposition of the varioua ways in which Augustine attempted to organize his faith into a system of thought. The selections from the treatises, sermons, and letters are well arranged and contain several new translations into English by competent scholars. Both the editor's exposition and Augustine's own efforts to face the basic issues created by the meeting of diverse systems of doctrine and language enable the student to become aware of the amazing range of Christian philosophy created by a man who was both a busy bishop and an inquisitive truth-seeker. The reader can follow Augustine himself in dealing with his problems, instead of being confronted with the literature and context of modernization or of apologetics. 304 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Since this volume is evidently and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:OSKAR PIEST, 1898-1987 Dr. Oskar Piest, who helped establish the Journal of the Historyof Philosophy, passed away at Sinsheim, Germany, in February 1987. He had studied theology and economics in pre-Hitler Germany, and became a banker in Hamburg. In 1934 he left because of his opposition to the Nazi government and went to Italy, then England, and finally in 1936 to the United States. After World War II he (...) organized and edited the Hafner Library of Classics. In 1949 he and his wife founded the Liberal Arts Press, publishing new, inexpensive, well-edited texts of works in the humanities. This grew into the Library of Liberal Arts which was purchased by Bobbs-Merrill in 1964. Dr. Piest then went to Brussels as a representative for various American banks in connection with the European Economic Community. He retired to Switzerland in 1971, and then to Germany, where he resumed his earlier theological studies, though his health and eyesight were failing. When I visited him in 1984, I found him deeply engrossed in researching pagan religions in the Near East in early Biblical times. He also established a foundation at Mesa College in Grand Junction, Colorado and gave much of his library to them. Dr. Piest worked closely with Herbert W. Schneider, and when the possibility of founding the Journal of the Historyof Philosophyoccurred in 196o and 1961, Dr. Piest was consulted. He met with some of us, gave us his advice, and joined our Board of Directors. He also generously assisted us for several years in financing the publication of the Journal--when such assistance was vital. Thereafter, he continued to be actively interested in the Journal and other projects in the history of philosophy. Although not a professional scholar, he greatly valued work in the history of philosophy to which he made a lasting contribution through his publishing ventures, and through helping to establish theJournal. On behalf of the Board of Directors, I want to express our gratitude to Oskar Piest, one of our first important benefactors. RICHARD H. POPKIN [345]... (shrink)

This paper uses the friendship and collaboration of Edwin Ray Lankester , zoologist, and Herbert George Wells , novelist and journalist, to challenge the current interpretation of late Victorian concern over degeneration as essentially an intellectual movement with little influence in contemporary debates over social and political problems. Degeneration theory provided for Lankester and Wells the basis both for a personal bond and for an active programme of social and educational reform. I trace the construction of Lankester’s account of (...) degeneration, initially as empirical ‘fact’ and later as ideologically inflected theory, and the reciprocal relationship between this theory and his critique of the British university system. I use Wells’s Outline of history to illustrate the profound influence of Lankester’s degenerationist worldview on Wells’s scientific and socio-political thought. Lankester’s synthesis of his theory and his critique led the two men to reject eugenics as an unscientific and ideologically incompatible solution to the problem of national deterioration. Instead, they campaigned for the reform of scientific education as a means of keeping mankind from physical, intellectual and cultural degeneration. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:128 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Nietzsches Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. 30 vols. in 8 sections. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter Co.) In Print: Section IV. Vol. 1. Richard Wagner in Bayreuth. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1875-1876 (1967), 366 pp. DM. 38 Vol. 2. Menschliches, Alzumenschliches I. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1876-1877. (1967), 586 pp. DM. 56 Vol. 3. Menschliches, Alzumenschliches H. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1878-1879. (1967), (...) 615 pp. DM. 48 Vol. 4. Nachbericht zur vierten Abteilung, by M. Montinari (1969), 615 pp. DM. 58 Section V. Vol. I. Morgenr6te. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1880-1881 (1971), 772 pp. DM. 86 Section VI. Vol. 1. Also sprach Zarathustra 1883-1885 (1968), 412 pp. DM. 41 Vol. 2. lenseits yon Gut und Bi~se. Zur Genealogie der Moral 1886-1887 (1968), 430 pp. DM. 43 Vol. 3. Der Fall Wagner. G6tzen-Diimmerung. Der Antichrist. Ecce Homo. Dionysos-Dithyramben. Nietzsche contra Wagner. 1888-1889 (1969), 449 pp. DM. 45 Section VIII. Vol. 2. Nachgelassene Fragmente Herbst 1887 bis Miirz 1888 (1970), 478 pp. DM. 58 Now in press: VIII, 3. Nachgelassene Fragmente Friihjahr 1888 bis An[ang Januar 1889 (1972), ca. 400 pp. Scheduled /or 1972: III, 1. Geburt der Trag6die. Unzeitgemiil3e Betrachtungen. III, 2. Baseler Nachgelassene Schri#en und Fragmente 1870-1874 V, 2. Die/r6hliche Wissenschafl. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1881-1882 VII, 2. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884 In 1959 two Italian scholars, Giorgio Colli (Piza) and Mazzino Montinari (Florence ), decided to make a new Italian translation of Nietz.sche's works. But the confusion surrounding the publication.of the posthumous fragments, particularly in the wake of the Schlechta-Edition controversy, caused the two men to question existing German editions. Montinari's visit to the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar in 1961 confirmed their growing conviction that the only way to eliminate the inaccuracies and BOOK REVIEWS 129 omissions with respect to the late fragments was to work from the original manuscripts. Since they had to go to Weimar anyway, they reasoned, why not take the bull by the horns and attempt a truly critical German edition of all of Niet.z.sche's writings as well? Now that nine of the planned thirty volumes of the German edition have been published, in particular IV, 4 (commentary to Section IV) and VIII, 2 (posthumous fragments of 1887-1888), it appears that the editors have an excellent chance of achieving not only a critical, but a definitive edition of Nietzsche's works. 1 Volumes IV, 4 and VIII, 2 are of special importance to our evaluation as, more than the other volumes published thus far, they reveal the critical and innovative features of the edition. It will pay to examine them in some detail. The first thing we encounter in volume IV, 4 is a statement of editorial principles. We learn that with regard to works which Nietzsche himself had published, both first editions and later editions approved by Nietzsche were consulted--a double-check was needed since Nietzsche with his bad eyesight was a poor proofreader. In the case of obvious printing errors that were retained through all the printed editions, final manuscripts were also referred to; usually several, as the scribes occasionally misunderstood Nietzsche when he dictated to them. The procedure is careful but it is also selective. What is to assure us that the editors made the right selection? This problem is dealt with in the 380 pages which collate all the variants found in the principal manuscripts and editions. Whenever possible, the reason for having variants is given. The explanation of the critical apparatus is a model of painstaking thoroughness. So far authenticity and objectivity have been achieved to a high degree. However, a principal difficulty in editing Nietzsche's works is chronology, determining the order in which the fragments and manuscripts were written. How did the editors proceed here? There is a section eighteen pages long on manuscript chronology and genesis in which the editors detail their reasoning and conclusions. To back this up there are two additional sections: (1) a page-by-page inventory of every manuscript used, summarizing the content of each page and listing such facts as the designation number, the presumed scribe, the kind... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:372 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tranquilly in a world shorn of illusions, avoiding the obvious pitfalls revealed by past human behavior. Bongie's excellent study should help us not only in placing Hume in his century, but in seeing the role of his History as a major part of his philosophical contribution. If, instead of simply seeing Hume as a radical because of his religious views in the context of 18th, (...) 19th, and 20th-century England and America, we can also see him as a conservative for his historical views in the context of 18th-century French events, we may get a richer and more meaningful Hume. We may also see first the revolutionary and then the conservative role that "philosophical history" played in the 18th century, and the tensions that existed between scepticism, Enlightenment, and conservatism in that period. And through this, we may get a clearer understanding of both the role that Hume's sceptical and historical contributions played then, and of the complex legacy that he has bequeathed us today. He was not only the precursor of Bertrand Russell and of modern analytic philosophy. He inspired a variety of conservative and orthodox tendencies in 18th-century France. To understand and appreciate the complete Hume, we need to see the full range of his intellectual achievements both then and now. And this may well help illuminate the roots and the meaning of some of the theories that have run most counter to the liberal and irreligious trends since the Enlightenment. One can hope that Bongie's significant study will be followed by others on the impact of "philosophical history," and of Hume's scepticism on the darker side of our past so that we may more fully appreciate the force and effect of modern scepticism and of the allied historical studies it spawned. Today, as we lose some of the optimism that the Enlightenment heroes bequeathed to us, we may be able to appreciate again some of the doubts and fears of those who struggled against it, and of those who sought solace in Hume's scepticism and in his picture of the human condition. RICHARD H. POPKI~ University oJ California, San Diego Passion and Value in Hume's TrmATxSE. By Piill S. /~rdal. (Edinburgh, at the University Press, 1966. Pp. x + 220. 45/.) This is a meticulous and critical examination of Hume's psychology of the emotional dimension of "human nature." The theme that emerges as central is the contrast between the mental structure of "the understanding" as Locke conceived it and those impressions and expressions in experience that are not perceptions or ideas but affections or passions. Emotions are not "associated" in the way ideas are, according to Locke; they are "communicated" and the ways in which communication among emotions takes place call for a very different type of analysis from the analysis of the understanding./~rdal shows in great detail and with acute observations that Hume is constantly on his guard against the theory of Locke's Essay, and puts his Treatise in the context of "experimental method" applied to the science of the emotions in their impressional and expressional relations. With this as the basic problem of the Treatise, /krdal criticizes those who today are interpreting the Treatise as a theory of evaluative judgment and language, whereas Hume is explicit in making a distinction between the analysis of the "nature and origin" of valuational experience and the logic of judgments of value which he is excluding. I-Iume approaches the passions as powers, and his analysis is closer to the Newtonian method of describing actions and reactions than to Locke's method of compounding simples. The passions are "naturally connected" and do not need to be consciously associated as perceptions do. They are all simple and indefinable, in view of Hume's interest in "moral science", he gives emphasis to the passions of pride, humility, and sympathy. The so-called compound passions or sentiments, such as benevolence, malice, anger together with the discussion of virtues and vices are kept distinct from the "direct" and elementary passions and energies of the mind and organism. Hume was not a hedonist, and he was a utilitarian only BOOK... (shrink)

Weisberg identifies the risks throughout a 2000 year span of western history of overly flexible responses to crises and perceived emergencies. So ensconced is the norm of infinite openness to ideas and changing circumstances that, he argues, his readers need to work hard to be able to resist the tendency of others to fold their tents and betray their own deepest and soundest values when challenged to do so by "new" conditions.

This is the third edition of a classic book first published in 1960, which has sold thousands of copies in two paperback edition and has been translated into several foreign languages. Popkin's work ha generated innumerable citations, and remains a valuable stimulus to current historical research. In this updated version, he has revised and expanded throughout, and has added three new chapters, one on Savonarola, one on Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, and one on Pascal. This authoritative treatment of the (...) theme of scepticism and its historical impact will appeal to scholars and students of early modern history now as much as ever. (shrink)

Mander's book is a welcomed addition to the recent interest in Francis Herbert Bradley's philosophy, especially his metaphysics. The formation of the new Bradleian Society and the soon to be published proceedings of papers written by contemporary philosophers like R. Wollheim, T. Sprigge, T. Baldwin, and S. Candlish and D. Holdcroft, among others, for the very successful F. H. Bradley Colloquium at Oxford attest to this renewed burst of scholarly energy in a thinker whom many believe had been disposed (...) of by Russell and Moore. However, it is not easy to eliminate the thought of a great philosopher, and especially one who made epoch-making contributions to logic, metaphysics, and ethics in our century and who has profoundly influenced philosophers like Whitehead and Russell, James and Dewey, Eliot and Blanshard. Caricatures and misrepresentations are the lot of every metaphysician from Parmenides to Whitehead; Bradley is no exception. A main objective of Mander's book is to expose these misunderstandings and to assess recent Bradleian scholarship with respect to several primal metaphysical notions developed principally in Bradley's Appearance and Reality and Essays on Truth and Reality. (shrink)

Public and professional debates have come to rely heavily on a special type of reasoning: the argument-from-ignorance, in which conclusions depend on the _lack_ of compelling information. "I win my argument," says the skillful advocate, "unless you can prove that I am wrong." This extraordinary gambit has been largely ignored in modern rhetorical and philosophical studies. Yet its broad force can be demonstrated by analogy with the modern legal system, where courts have long manipulated burdens of proof with skill and (...) subtlety. This legal, philosophical, and rhetorical study by Richard H. Gaskins provides the first systematic treatment of arguments-from-ignorance across a wide range of modern discourse—from constitutional law, scientific inquiry, and moral philosophy to organizational behavior, computer operation, and personal interaction. Gaskins reviews the historic shifts in constitutional proof burdens that have shaped public debate on fundamental rights and, by analogy, on the fundamental status of intellectual and cultural authority. He shows how similar shifts have dominated polemical battles between scientific and ethical modes of authority, affecting both academic and popular discussion. Finally, he discovers the philosophical roots of default reasoning strategies in the arguments of Kant and nineteenth-century Kantian schools. Concluding that shifting proof burdens are inescapable in a world of scientific and moral uncertainty, Gaskins emphasizes the common strategic ground shared by dogmatic and skeptical reasoning. Using Hegelian strategies, he describes a more pluralistic temper that can move critical thinking beyond polemics and strengthen our capacities for common discourse. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Many existing biomedical vocabulary standards rest on incomplete, inconsistent or confused accounts of basic terms pertaining to diseases, diagnoses, and clinical phenotypes. Here we outline what we believe to be a logically and biologically coherent framework for the representation of such entities and of the relations between them. We defend a view of disease as involving in every case some physical basis within the organism that bears a disposition toward the execution of pathological processes. We present our view in the (...) form of a list of terms and definitions designed to provide a consistent starting point for the representation of both disease and diagnosis in information systems in the future. (shrink)

In the world according to Hume, people are complicated creatures, with convoluted, often contradictory characters. Consider, for example, Hume's controversial assessment of Charles I: "The character of this prince, as that of most men, if not of all men, was mixed .... To consider him in the most favourable light, it may be affirmed, that his dignity was free from pride, his humanity from weakness, his bravery from rashness, his temperance from austerity, his frugality from avarice .... To speak the (...) most harshly of him, we may affirm, that many of his good qualities were attended with some latent frailty, which, though seemingly inconsiderable, was able, when seconded by the extreme malevolence of his fortune, to disappoint them of all their influence: His beneficent disposition was clouded by a manner not very gracious; his virtue was tinctured with superstition; his good sense was disfigured by a deference to persons of a capacity inferior to his own; and his moderate temper exempted him not from hasty and precipitate resolutions." This sketch shows Charles in all his complexities, with his virtues, near virtues, and contradicting virtues. I have quoted it at length because it is hard to summarize without losing the subtleties that lie within it. Hume's moral theory is based fundamentally on judgments of character, 2 so those subtleties are important to his view. The character sketches that pervade the.. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to expose a basic flaw at the root of perennialism as a method for studying mysticism—its distinction between ‘exoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ components of mysticism and religion. Rather than being distinct, the specific ‘exoteric’ doctrines of a given mystic’s tradition penetrate the mystics’ knowledge-claims. Thus, the ‘esoteric’ dimension in a mystical tradition is permeated by that mystical tradition’s ‘exoteric’ doctrines, not by the transcultural and ahistorical perennial spine that perennialists postulate. Contrary to what the perennialists (...) suggest, there is no one underlying esoteric set of beliefs embedded in all traditional religions that all mystics share. Rather, in the different religious traditions of the world, there are genuinely different mysticisms with different beliefs, practices, values, and goals. Thus, the perennialist approach distorts the history of mysticism. It is better seen as a theology of religions than as an alleged discernment of timeless truths presented throughout the history of mysticism. (shrink)

Public health is concerned with increasing the health of the community at whole. Insofar as health is a ‘good’ and the community constitutes a ‘public’, public health by definition promotes a ‘public good’. But ‘public good’ has a particular and much more narrow meaning in the economics literature, and some commentators have tried to limit the scope of public health to this more narrow meaning of a ‘public good’. While such a move makes the content of public health less controversial, (...) it also strips important goals from the realm of public health, goals that traditionally have been, and morally should be, a part of it. Instead, I will argue, while public health should be defined by public goods, it should be defined by a broader conception of public goods that I shall call ‘normative public goods’, goods that ought to be treated as if they were public goods in the more narrow sense. (shrink)

This article explicates, in a concrete, step-by-step manner, some procedures that can be followed in phenomenologically analyzing interview data. It also addresses a number of issues that are raised in relation to phenomenological research.

‘The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for particular purposes.’ Among the many purposes for which Wittgenstein assembled reminders, the deeper understanding of the religious life would have to qualify as one. Though on first reading this would hardly seem obvious, I hope to make this abundantly clear through an examination of his later literature. There are two ways in which he sheds light on religious issues: first , by the personal passion of his own life and the (...) forthright display of intellectual integrity expected of any professional thinker toward any discipline , and, second , by making his philosophical investigations descriptive. Any analysis of religious issues or the understanding of the religious life should involve the high degree of personal integrity and the rigorously descriptive method which Wittgenstein makes apparent throughout his writing. (shrink)

Systematics based solely on structuralist principles is non-science because it is derived from first principles that are inconsistent in dealing with both synchronic and diachronic aspects of evolution, and its evolutionary models involve hidden causes, and unnameable and unobservable entities. Structuralist phylogenetics emulates axiomatic mathematics through emphasis on deduction, and “hypotheses” and “mapped trait changes” that are actually lemmas and theorems. Sister-group-only evolutionary trees have no caulistic element of scientific realism. This results in a degenerate systematics based on patterns of (...) fact or evidence being treated as so fundamental that all other data may be mapped to the cladogram, resulting in an apparently well-supported classification that is devoid of evolutionary theory. Structuralism in systematics is based on a non-ultrametric analysis of sister-group informative data that cannot detect or model a named taxon giving rise to a named taxon, resulting in classifications that do not reflect macroevolutionary changes unless they are sister lineages. Conservation efforts are negatively affected through epistemological extinction of scientific names. Evolutionary systematics is a viable alternative, involving both deduction and induction, hypothesis and theory, developing trees with both synchronic and diachronic dimensions often inferring nameable ancestral taxa, and resulting in classifications that advance evolutionary theory and explanations for particular groups. (shrink)

Systematics based solely on structuralist principles is non-science because it is derived from first principles that are inconsistent in dealing with both synchronic and diachronic aspects of evolution, and its evolutionary models involve hidden causes, and unnameable and unobservable entities. Structuralist phylogenetics emulates axiomatic mathematics through emphasis on deduction, and “hypotheses” and “mapped trait changes” that are actually lemmas and theorems. Sister-group-only evolutionary trees have no caulistic element of scientific realism. This results in a degenerate systematics based on patterns of (...) fact or evidence being treated as so fundamental that all other data may be mapped to the cladogram, resulting in an apparently well-supported classification that is devoid of evolutionary theory. Structuralism in systematics is based on a non-ultrametric analysis of sister-group informative data that cannot detect or model a named taxon giving rise to a named taxon, resulting in classifications that do not reflect macroevolutionary changes unless they are sister lineages. Conservation efforts are negatively affected through epistemological extinction of scientific names. Evolutionary systematics is a viable alternative, involving both deduction and induction, hypothesis and theory, developing trees with both synchronic and diachronic dimensions often inferring nameable ancestral taxa, and resulting in classifications that advance evolutionary theory and explanations for particular groups. (shrink)

This book gives a descriptive analysis of specific Madhyamika texts. It compares the ideology of Kumarajiva (a translator of the four Madhyamika treatises 400 A.D.) with the ideologies of the three Chinese contemporaries - HuiYuan, Seng-Jui and Seng-Chao. It envisages an intercultural transmission of religious and philosophical ideas from India to China.

: The idea of enhancing our mental functions through medical means makes many people uncomfortable. People have a vague feeling that altering our brains tinkers with the core of our personalities and the core of ourselves. It changes who we are, and doing so seems wrong, even if the exact reasons for the unease are difficult to define. Many of the standard arguments against neuroenhancements—that they are unsafe, that they violate the distinction between therapy and enhancements, that they undermine equality, (...) and that they will be used coercively—fail to show why the use of any such technologies is wrong in principle. Two other objections—the arguments that such changes undermine our integrity and that they prevent us from living authentic lives—will condemn only a few of the uses that are proposed. The result is that very few uses of these drugs are morally suspect and that most uses are morally permissible. (shrink)

P. O. Bodunrin, in his 1981 essay, asks: ‘Is there an African Philosophy, and if there is, what is it?’ This question has occupied centre stage among younger African intellectuals for about a decade now. The most articulate among these intellectuals, who are themselves philosophers, are Bodunrin , Kwasi Wiredu , H. Odera Oruka , Marcien Towa and Eboussi Boulaga , and Paulin Hountondji . These philosophers among others are in dialogue with one another and currently are seen to be (...) the principal architects of a new orientation in African thought. (shrink)

A comprehensive exploration of the philosophical issues raised by mysticism. This work is a comprehensive study of the philosophical issues raised by mysticism. Mystics claim to experience reality in a way not available in normal life, a claim which makes this phenomenon interesting from a philosophical perspective. Richard H. Jones’s inquiry focuses on the skeleton of beliefs and values of mysticism: knowledge claims made about the nature of reality and of human beings; value claims about what is significant and (...) what is ethical; and mystical goals and ways of life. Jones engages language, epistemology, metaphysics, science, and the philosophy of mind. Methodological issues in the study of mysticism are also addressed. Examples of mystical experience are drawn chiefly from Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta, but also from Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Daoism. “This is a significant extension of the seminal work by Walter Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy. That work has stimulated much literature, all of which Jones manages to review here. He critically extends Stace’s universal core and embeds it in a sophisticated discussion of the extent, range, and metaphysical implications of mysticism.” — Ralph W. Hood, Jr., coauthor of The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach. (shrink)

Reductionism’s approach brings together many of the most interesting questions today in philosophy and in science . It also presents a brief history of how reductionism has developed in Western philosophy and religion, with reference to Indian philosophy on certain issues.

Neuroscientific scanning of meditators is taken as providing data on mystical experiences. However, problems concerning how the brain and consciousness are related cast doubts on whether any understanding of the content of meditative experiences is gained through the study of the brain. Whether neuroscience can study the subjective aspects of meditative experiences in general is also discussed. So too, whether current neuroscience can establish that there are “pure consciousness events” in mysticism is open to question. The discussion points to limitations (...) on neuroscience's capability to add to our understanding of the phenomenological content of mystical experiences. (shrink)

The complete title of the Principles is A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are Inquired into. The complete title of the Dialogues is Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. The design of which is plainly to demonstrate the reality and perfection of human knowledge, the incorporeal nature of the soul, and the immediate providence of a Deity: in opposition to (...) Sceptics and Atheists. Also to open a method for rendering the Sciences more easy, useful, and compendious. The introductions to each work, as well as various remarks in the Philosophical Commentaries, explain at greater length the author's intention of refuting the sceptics and atheists. In the initial section of the introduction to the Principles, Berkeley had said that the attempt to understand the nature of things had led men into all sorts of "uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies,... till at length, having wander'd through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn scepticism." And a few sections later, Berkeley stated that his intention was to discover the sources of the absurdities and contradictions that have entered philosophy, and to eliminate them. (shrink)

Wittgenstein, in his characteristic way of indirectly bringing us to see an important feature in human life, said: ‘… art shows us the miracles of nature… We say: “Just look at it opening out!” This essay discusses how works of art ‘blossom’ and thus elicit an imaginative human response. Its various parts focus on the connected theme that some sensible component is essential to the production and comprehension of art. Each part, however, investigates a different aspect of the theme and (...) could stand on its own. What will be argued about this aesthetic factor in art will also be shown to cast light on our understanding of certain narrative texts and ceremonial acts of religion. (shrink)

i. In the Philosophical Investigations , Ludwig Wittgenstein yoked together these remarks: Essence is expressed by grammar. Grammar tells what kind of object anything is.